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Amakuclari (Descent from Heaven):
The Cement between the Japanese Polity and Economy

Amakudari (descent from heaven) refers to the process where top ministry bureaucrats retire to
senior management positions in private enterprises. It is pivotal to the overall strategic planning
and coordination of the Japanese economy. A number of authors have speculated on the changing
nature and future directions of this important institution. This paper explores these views based
on the examination of data from 1963 to 1992.

2

Amakudari (Descent from Heaven):
The Cement between the Japanese Polity and Economy

One distinguishing characteristic of the Japanese political-economy is the close working
relationship between the government and business. The ties that bind the government and the
corporate sljctor are many, but one of the rilosl important is amakudari.

Government

bureaucrats, upon iheir retirement, move from high government positions to high level positions
in private enterprise--a direction of elite mobility that is opposite to the general patterns found ·
in the Unitj States (Johnson, 1982: 20-21).

'

.

A seles of recent political scandals and US-Japan trade talks have heightened interest in
I

-

-

the roles of bureaucrats, the mechanisms of amakudari, and its network relations between the
government and corporate world. For some (Johnson, 1974; do Rosario, 1993), amakudari is
a characteriltic of the "developmental state" and will decrease, either because of gradual decline._
in "very real needs" of expertise of bureaucrats among corporations over time (Johnson, 1974),
I

-

I

.

.

or continued foreign pressures for opening up of Japanese markets. Others (Aoki, 1988; Kerbo
and McKinJtry, 1995) suggest that amakudari is a fundamental institutional mechanism and
should incrlse as the complexity and uncertainty of government decision making increases.
Still some Jthers (Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1988), emphasizing amakudari as a measure of

j

. sector, maintain
. . that there 1s
. no part1cu
. ·1ar reason
contro1 of ule government over the econmmc
I
to expect ama

an to b-ecome e1t. -her more_- or 1ess common.

kud-

•

1
I d'1verse mterpre,tatlons
·
.
- . to changmg
. £eatures
-•
owmg
may not be mutuall-y exc1us1ve,
These

of the reladonship between ihe government and the private sector over time. Nor are they
falsifiable i any strict scientific sense. Howev~r, these generalizations are primarily based on
J
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only one or a few years of data and often on the amakudari of a single ministry. This paper
supplements the existing empirical findings by illustrating the more general patterns of

amakudari based on the examination of data from all ministries and agencies over the past three
decades. This broader -spatial and temporal frame clarifies the implications of the different
interpretations of amakudari.
We explore the patterns of change in amakudari from 1963 to 1992. This paper is
organized as follows: First, we discuss the major institutional features of amakudari. Second,
we present descriptive analysis of changes in the overall pattern of amakudari during the past
thirty years. Finally, we discuss the relative pattern of amakudari placements among six key
ministries over the last thirty years.

AMAKUDARI

There is increasing recognition that much of the governing of Japan is not done by
politicians but by bureaucrats. The sources of bureaucratic power are the raison d'etre of the

amakudari process. The sources of bureaucratic power are their legislative and administrative
roles, experience and mechanisms of "guidance" of the private sector. Johnson (1974; 1975),
Kerbo and McKinstry (1995), and Okimoto (1989), to name a few, summarize them as follows:
First, bureaucrats write most bills and give them to the politicians to pass into
legislation. 1 In Japan, politicians do not have their own policy making staffs (nor the Diet) and
rely on the civil servants. The ministries that write the legislation are also the ministries that

1

Eighty percent of bureaucratically sponsored bills pass the Diet, where only thirty percent
of Diet sponsored bill pass (Kishimoto, 1988:66; Koh, 1989:206 cited by Kerbo and McKinstry,
1995).
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enforce the legislation. Thus, these laws are often written vaguely giving them wide flexibility
in interpreting and applying the law.

In contrast, in the U;S., politicians (especially the

President· and members of Congress) draw from their large staff and groups of experts
independent of the government bureaucrats. They pass legislation and give it to the bureaucrats
to

implement.
Second, vice-ministers have life-long career experience as bureaucratic officials with the

most seniority in the ministry. Their training, experience, extensive knowledge in the ministry,
and the loyalty of thousands of other bureaucratic officials working under them provide them
with extraordinary influence. In contrast to these "career bureaucrats," the individual ministers,
formally superior to the vice-ministers, are temporary political appointees with far less
administrative experience than the vice ministers.
Third, "administrative guidance" of the private sector rests on Japanese law giving the
ministries the authority to issue directives, requests, warnings, suggestions, and encouragements
to private organizations. The government control over some markets has opened somewhat
(e.g., citrus, supercomputers, beef), but there are indications that the number of regulations
actually rose recently (Sterngold, 1994).
Fourth, "economic guidance" is the control ministries have over commercial loans. In
contrast to the U.S. , corporations in Japan are more likely to expand through bank loans, rather
than new stock issues (Abegglen and Stark, 1985). Ministries target industries for development
and carry out their plans by directly influencing which corporations and industries secure the
capital for their growth. In addition, they indirectly influence the access to capital of target
industries through "administrative guidance" to private banks, and their control over the Japan
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Development Bank and the Bank of Japan (both government agencies).
Several studies contend that amakudari is driven by the pressures arising out of the logic
of seniority system within ministries. Johnson (1982) and Okimoto (1989), for example, discuss
the process of amakudari within one of the most powerful ministries, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI).

Horne (1988) and Kerbo and McKinstry (1995)

describe amakudari based on the training and promotion processes of the Ministry of Finance
(MoF). It works as follows: Entering bureaucrats, upon passing the civil servant exam (type
1) and being selected to the ministry, go through extensive training and advance together. By
the time these bureaucrats reach their 40's, their career mobility options begin to narrow. There
are a limited number of section chief positions, few bureau chief positions, and only one viceministership for each ministry. Those who are promoted to bureau chief are still in the running
for vice-ministership. Those who are not promoted are compelled to resign into a lucrative job
in a private industry or public corporation .. Ultimately, everyone must "descend" because of the
unrelenting pressure from new entering classes advancing from below. The usual retirement age
for the vice-minister is slightly over 50.
Not everyone competes for the vice-ministership. Many bureaucrats retire before they
reach the level of bureau chief. The process of separating those who will resign early and those
who will stay in the ministry is called kata-tataki (the tap on the shoulder) or mabiki (thinning
out). Nevertheless, the final weeding out comes at the vice-ministerial level, when one man
from one class is chosen by the outgoing vice-minister as his own replacement and when all the
new vice-minister's class mates must resign to insure that he has absolute seniority in the
ministry. The new vice-minister and the chief of the Secretariat are responsible for finding the
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retiring officials (and fellow classmates) good new positions in the private sector.
Retirement of bureaucrats may take one of several forms. According to Johnson, retiring
·government officials obtain new careers along one of three general paths:

1. Bureaucrats move into profit making enterprises. The movement from ministry or
agency to a private business is a strict definition of "descent from heaven" (amakudan)
and is subject to legal restrictions.
2. Bureaucrats move into public corporations or "special legal entities." These public
corporations are established by law and financed in part from public funds. Reemployment by such an organization is called "sideslip" (yokosuben) and is not subject
to legal restrictions.

3. Some bureaucrats move into the political world, chiefly by becoming a candidate for
election to the Diet, most commonly as a member of the House of Councilors. This
post-retirement career is called "position exploitation" (chii riyo). This path is usually
open only to bureaucrats who served in choice national or regional posts that are suitable
for building general political support (1974: 953-954).
The literature on the political economy of Japan is vague on the exact definition of

amakudari. In general, amakudari refers to a career movement of a bureaucrat from ministry
or agency to private business (Johnson, 1974:953; Hollerman, 1988:175; Okimoto, 1989:319).
However, some of these same authors broaden their definition of amakudari to include
employment in both private and public organizations (Johnson, 1978:5; Okimoto 1989: 161;
Prestowitz, 1988:113). For example, Okimoto defines amakudari as:
... leaving the bureaucracy [and] 'descend from heaven' into high-level posts in public
corporations, industrial associations, and private industry (Okimoto, 1989: 161).
Still others (Calder, 1989:382; Aoki, 1988:265) define amakudari as re-employment of
bureaucrats in private and public organizations, as well as political positions.

amakudari as:

Aoki defines
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. . . bureaucrats who quit the bureaucracy after attaining positions higher than that. of
section director in the administrative hierarchy 'descend from the heaven' (amakudari)
of the elite bureaucracy . . . become available as human resources for national and local
politics, business management in private and public corporations, and other consulting
activities (Aoki, 1988:265).
In this paper we use Johnson's first definition of amakudari, that is, a career movement
of retiring bureaucrats to the private sector, leaving the questions of career movements to public
and political sectors for separate, later studies.

PERSPECTIVES ON AMAKUDARI
Recent literature on the political economy of Japan suggests three perspectives on the
nature of amakudari: (1) Japanese insulation and regulation; (2) Institutional imperative; and (3)
Government control.
1. Japanese Insulation and Regulation.

This perspective contends that amakudari ·

developed out of Japan's need for insulation and regulation during its rapid industrialization.
Although this perspective implies a strong element of free market, its argument takes several
forms all suggesting amakudari is in decline.

One variation contends that after the rapid

industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s, strict insulation was no longer needed, and in tum,
retired bureaucrats lost much of their usefulness to business (Johnson, 1974).

A second

variation contends that amakudari is a form of corruption that operates to enrich certain elite
groups by excluding others from Japanese markets. 2

2

A final variation is that amakudari

Amakudari has been implicated in the compromise of government oversight agencies
(Administrative Management Agency) charged with· regulation of private business and public
enterprises because of the reliance on recommendations from influential ministries (Johnson,
1975: 7). Further, amakudari has been implicated in bid rigging in the construction industry
(Arakawa, 1993).
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operates between government and business as a hidden barrier to entry into lucrative Japanese
markets. Critics (do Rosario, 1993: 55) charge that amakudari is "a hindrance to the opening
up of Japan."
This perspective suggests that recent trade disputes and continuing foreign pressures to
bring down trade barriers and de-regulate domestic markets will reduce the linkage between the
government bureaucracy and the domestic markets. 3 It predicts the decline of amakudari as
Japan is increasingly pressured from international trade partners to reduce trade surplus, to ease
inspection and certification rules for foreign goods, and to shift from the producer oriented to
more consumer oriented society (Uekusa, 1987). One analysis (do Rosario, 1993) shows the
decline in the number of amakudari positions since the mid-1980s as evidence for this
perspective. However, this short time period does not represent the overall pattern, nor does
the study by do Rosario offer a substantive interpretation of how "external pressures" should
affect the number of amakudari after the mid-1980s and not other periods.
Proposition 1: Amakudari is in a decline since the mid-1980s due to outside pressure for
open markets and de-regulation.

2. Institutional Imperative.

This perspective contends that as ministries achieved

success over time, amakudari became institutionalized as a mechanism to assure their future
success.

3

The institution of amakudari became an integral mechanism for maintaining

A current list of U.S. demands includes: increased sales of American auto parts to
Japanese companies; opening of the Japanese distribution system to American cars; measurable
increases in Japanese government purchases of American medical equipment and
telecommunications equipment; and an increased market share of American life insurance in
Japan, a level comparable to foreign insurers' market shares in other major economies
(Sterngold, 1994).
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"ministerial fortress" and replenishing the bureaucratic ranks with talent. The assurance of postretirement careers for top bureaucrats is critical in recruiting and motivating the most talented
and the brightest, who otherwise would seek more lucrative careers in the private industry
(Johnson, 1974; Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995; Okimoto, 1988).
In Japan, civil servants are powerful and accorded high respect, but they receive a very

modest income. 4 They are respected because they come from the best universities and are
"bred" through demanding training and testing for their jobs. They are career bureaucrats. The
assurance of attractive post-retirement jobs makes civil service all the more attractive. In short,
the institutional perspective suggests that the assurance of amakudari to high-profile positions
in private industry becomes increasingly necessary to attract the requisite talent.
This perspective implies that political uncertainty is positively related to dynamics
facilitating amakudari placements. In view of political scandals that led to the fall of the Liberal
Democratic Party in 1992 and the fragile state of the present political situation, one would argue
the bureaucratic elite will become more important, and the talent requirements all the more
pressing. This perspective suggests a general increase in amakudari placement over time.
Proposition 2: There is a general increase in amakudari over time as ministries attempt
to maintain their continued success by attracting the brightest and talented.
3. Government Control. To many authors (Johnson, 1974; 1978; 1982; Okimoto,
1988), amakudari is an important mechanism of government control over private industry.

4

As Kerbo and McKinstry (1995) illustrate, it is not high income that attract the brightest
and most talented young college graduates to pursue civil service careers. In 1984, majority of
bureaucratic elite made only $48,000 to $79,000, while income among the majority of industrial
elite was at least twice that amount, at $160,000 or more.
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Amakudari is a key link between ministry and central financial and industrial sectors of the
economy. The private sector participates in amakudari because of the extensive licensing and
approval authority (kyoninkaken) of the ministries, though some firms and industries are more
receptive of amakudari placements than others.

According to the government control

perspective, there is a greater receptivity of amakudari placements in industries and firms subject
to "administrative guidance" by government (Johnson: 1974: 963). The ministries do not give
direct orders to businesses, but those businesses that listen to the signals coming from the
ministry and then respond are favored with easy access to capital, tax breaks, and approval of
their plans to import foreign technology or establish joint ventures. Thus, the governmentcontrol perspective suggests that amakudari is a measure of the extent of government control,
more precisely, a measure of the relative importance of ministerial control over the economy.
The "government control" perspective is rooted in a recognition of the unique political
economy of Japan. That is, the institutional configuration of Japan represents a state directed
economy that is non-socialist. A measure of the degree of that government control of the
economy is the number of amakudari placements. Variations of this perspective speculate on the
waxing or waning of this bureaucratic control. However, basically this perspective simply
identifies aggregate annual amakudari as a measure of that control.
Proposition 3: Amakudari placements are a measure of the degree of bureaucratic control
of the private sector.
The government control perspective suggests the amakudari placements of particular
ministries are both a measure of their control over the economic sector they regulate, and a
measure of their relative power vis-a-vis the other ministries (Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1988;
1989). Okimoto contends that:

10
The re-employment of higher civil servants in high level posts within the private sector
(amakudari) is perhaps the best unobtrusive indicator of relative bureaucratic power
... (1988:319).
Johnson (1982) points to a change in the distribution of amakudari positions among different
ministries since the mid-1970s, indicating the changing influence of different ministries.
Johnson's (1974; 1982) and Okimoto's (1988) examinations of data on amakudari for 1963-1973
and the year 1976, respectively, suggest power has shifted among ministries, in particular, the
relative decline of MITI, along with the rise of Ministry of Finance (MoF).

MoF and MIT!

are considered by most observers to be the most powerful ministries, in part, because of the
scope of their responsibilities. MoF is supposed to govern macro economic policy and MITI
governs most domestic and international industrial policies (Okimoto, 1989: 113-114). The
other ministries and agencies have narrower, industry specific, responsibilities and therefore, a
narrower group of clients (Nester, 1993: 107). Okimoto (1988: 320) points out that ministries
in charge of functionally specific sectors like the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine
Products (MAFM), Construction (MoC), Transportation (MoT), Health and Welfare .(MHW),
and Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) are powerful vis-a-vis the other ministries and
agencies. 5 Their regulatory responsibilities are high and the adherence to directives and mutual
interdependence of government and business is high resulting in incentives to develop and
maintain extensive relational networks through amakudari placements.
Proposition 3 .1 : Amakudari placements of each ministry are a measure of the degree of
that ministry's control of the private sector.

5

Okimoto (1988: 320) includes the Ministry of Health and Welfare among ministries
considered powerful by their amakudari placements in 1976. However, the year 1976 was an
aberration in a much more modest pattern of placements for that ministry.
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DATA

The data derive from the annual reports of amakudari published by the Agency of
Personnel Authority for the period, 1963 to 1992 for all ministries and agencies. Nineteen sixtythree was the initial publication of amakudari on a systematic basis after the Diet amended the
Government Employee Act, Article 103 (Kokka Komuin Ho 103) mandated the public disclosure
of amakudari reports in 1962.

Each annual publication contains information on ministry

positions of each bureaucrat in the last five years of service and the description of new positions
in the private sector for all the ministries and agencies that had amakudari. There are some
forty ministries and agencies (Appendix A). Japanese law prohibits bureaucrats from accepting
positions in private enterprises regulated by their ministry for two years after leaving the civil
service. The Agency of Personnel Authority has the power to approve or disapprove amakudari
of retiring bureaucrats at the level of section chief and above. Johnson (1974) and Okimoto
(1988) used this same data source for particular periods or ministries. Thus, our results are
comparable and extend their analyses.

RESULTS
Overall Trend
Appendix B indicates the total number of amakudari among all the ministries and
agencies that took place each year over the thirty year period, 1963-1992. The total number
ranged from the low of 123 in 1967 to the high of 320 in 1985 with a mean average of 205.
Figure 1 graphically displays the annual amakudari placements between 1963 and 1992.
The examination of data in Figure 1 yields several observations. The data reveal the
presence of three minor periods: 1963-1976, 1976-1985, and 1985-present. · The number of
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amakudari was most stable in the first period, 1963-1976, with the average number of 161
amakudari. In sharp contrast to the stable pattern-in the first period, the second period 19761985 involved an explosive rise in the number of amakudari. It rose from 159 in 1976 to 320
in 1985, with the average number of 241 amakudari during this ten year period. The magnitude
of this increase is over 100 percent. In the third period, 1985-1992, the number of amakudari
declined, from 320 in 1985 to 209 in 1992, or 35 percent fall. During this eight year period,
the average number of ainakudari was 24 7.
The question of whether amakudari is on the rise or decline depends on which period is
selected for examination. Period two, 1976-1985, shows a sharp increase in the number of
amakudari, suggesting support for the "institutional" perspective. Period three, 1985- 1992,
shows a precipitous decline, lending support for the "Japanese insulation and regulation"
perspective. Period one, 1963-1976, and the overall 1963-1992 period with the average of 205

amakudari, suggest that amakudari patterns in the mid-1980s were an aberration. In general,
amakudari placements are in the range of 150 to 250 and rose slightly over the past 30 years.
The interpretation of fluctuations in amakudari over time is problematic, because
logically one would expect that what causes increases in the second period, was inverted in the
third period. This symmetry is not apparent.

For example, the "Japanese insulation and

regulation" perspective points to amakudari decline in period three, contending. it is symptomatic
.

of Japan opening up its markets. 6 However, this perspective offers only a partial explanation

6

Some contend that since the mid-1980s US-Japan trade negotiation entered a qualitatively
different, new phase, characterized by "managed trade talks." For example, the U.S. began to
apply enormous pressures on Japan to guarantee a 20 percent market share for semiconductors
and threatened sanctions if it was not achieved. Equally significant is the Plaza Accord of 1985
which appreciated the value of the yen against the American dollar, making Japanese products
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for the overall trend of amakudari in the past 30 years. It fits nicely for the continuing decline
in amakudari for period three in Figure 1, but the argument contradicts with the modest but
overall increase in amakudari for the entire period, 1963-1992. It certainly cannot explain the
sharp rise in the period two. Was Japan closing its markets after the first oil shock? Similarly,
those supporting the institutional perspective might point to period two or the overall trend and
argue that amakudari is institutionalized into the political economy of Japan. However, does
this mean that amakudari is being "de-institutionalized" during the third period? The-distribution
of amakudari over the past three decades suggests that the underlying causes of change in

amakudari may not be uniform across the three periods, reflecting different causal dynamics
during the different periods.
Trends within Ministries
There are 12 main ministries and some 30 agencies in the Japanese government
(Appendix A). Not all the ministries and agencies are equal in "importance and power. "7 In
fact, the most notable observation is that the distribution of amakudari vary considerably across

more expensive to American consumers. In February 1985, the exchange rate stood at 263 yen
to one dollar. The current exchange rate dropped to 100 yen to the dollar, diminishing the
abilities of Japanese corporations to compete in the international economy.
7

Subjective interpretations vary on which ministries are the most important and powerful.
Kerbo and McKinstry (1995) suggest that the most important and powerful are the Ministries
of Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and MITI. Okimoto's (1988) survey of 21 government
officials indicated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be only "fairly influential" and does not
mention the Ministry of Justice. In contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very weak based
on our behavioral (as opposed to a reputational) measure of "influence and power" (i.e.
amakudari). Given the nature of expertise, however, it is not surprising to find weak linkages
between these ministries and private industry. One would expect bureaucrats from ministries
of Justice and Foreign Affairs to take post-retirement careers in the public and academic spheres
or to pursue business that is not arranged through amakudari (e.g., consulting).
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ministries and agencies.

The data reveal that the following six ministries had significant

numbers of amakudari over time: the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Construction (MoC), the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine Products
(MAFM), and the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) (Table 1).
Table 1 summarizes the top five rankings of ministries in terms of the number of

amakudari over time. It shows the dominance of the Ministry of Finance. MoF retained the
top rank since 1965, by placing the largest number of retiring bureaucrats in the corporations.
MITI is much less stable than MoF, but it is the next most powerful throughout the observation
period. MITI ranked either second or third, except in 1975 and 1992. Next to MITI is the
Ministry of Construction, fluctuating between the second, third, and fourth places. The Ministry
of Transportation ranked consistently behind MoF and MITI, but after the mid-1980s its ranking
was in clear decline. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine Products moved up the
ranking over time. In 1965, it ranked fifth, but fourth in 1970 and 1975, third in 1985, fourth
in 1990, and third in 1992. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications entered the top five
rankings from time to time during the past 30 year period.

MoF outpaced all others in
I

amakudari during the past three decades, except for 1963 and 1964. The number of amakudari
I

increased consistently, especially in the first two periods, 1963-1976 and 1976-1985 (Figure
2.1). It almost doubled its amakudari placements during the last 30 years. According to the
control perspective, this suggests that MoF has substantially increased its control over; the
financial sector of Japanese society.

It also suggests that financial control may be a' key

mechanism of state coordination of the Japanese economy.
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MITI's pattern, shown in Figure 2.2, involves erratic shifts in the first period (19631976), followed by a more consistent increase in the second period (1976-1985) and a decline
in the third (1985-1992). The overall trend is one of annual variation, mostly between 20 and
30 placements, but with no substantial growth or decline over the thirty year time period. The
control perspective would suggest that MITI' s control over the past 30 years has relatively been
stable.
The high quality of MoF and MITI officials and their networks of information make
bureaucrats from these two ministries attractive for private companies to hire upon their
retirement. A comparison of MoF with MITI substantiates Johnson's (1982) and Okimoto's
(1988) contention that the MoF superseded MITI to became the dominant ministry.

In

particular, Johnson (1974: 963) suggests continuous importance of amakudari in banking
industries where connections with MoF remain invaluable, whereas the significance of

amakudari in other ministries might decline over time.
The pattern of amakudari placements for the Ministry of Construction (MoC) is similar
to that of MITI, only it demonstrates even more stability (Figure 2.3). Placements range from
a low of 10 in 1971 and 1976 to a high of 30 in 1981 and 1987. The overall pattern is relatively
stable with no significant increase or decrease during the 30 year period.

The control

perspective would suggest there is a stable control relationship between the government and
construction industries.
The Ministry of Transportation (MoT) demonstrates wide variation, with a high in 1963
of 44 and a low of 11 placements in both 1967 and 1972 (Figure 2.4). Disregarding 1963, the
ministry placements were relatively stable through the 1960s and 1970s, then increased through
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the early 1980s and decreased after 1984. MoT appears to reflect the overall trend of amakudari
patterns.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Marine Products (MAFM) demonstrates a
pattern of relative steady increase until recently (Figure 2.5). Amakudari placements started at
a low of 2 in 1963 but increased to a high of 37 in 1987. The overall pattern is marked by its
steady increase, suggesting that the scope of the government's jurisdiction and regulatory
responsibilities have increased over time, at least until 1987.
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) demonstrates a pattern similar to
the MAFM (Figure 2.6). In 1965 the MPT had only 2 amakudari placement, but the number
increased to 29 in 1985. Again, this pattern of steady increase suggests a rising control of the
government over the postal and telecommunications industries. This is one of the most vigorous
and growing sectors of the economy, creating new demands for retiring bureaucrats.

DISCUSSION
The evidence presented in Figure 1 suggests that the number of amakudari rose until the
mid-1980s, indicating the increased interpenetration of the government and corporate world.
However, starting in 1985, the trend came to a halt and reversed its direction. Examination of
the 30 year trend suggests that a complex causal dynamic underlies the pattern of amakudari
placements.
The first perspective is partially supported in our analysis. The "Japanese Insulation and
Regulation" perspective suggests that amakudari will decline due to outside pressures for open
trade and deregulation. The data on overall placements (Figure 1) supports the notion with the
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decline of amakudari talcing place since 1986. However, scholars advocating this perspective
need to show how and why pressures increased in the mid-1980s, but not in other periods.
Further, the concept of decline or increase raises the question of the relative standard. If the
comparison is made to the entire period from 1963 to 1992, there is no significant decline in
amakudari. In fact, amakudari placements show a modest increase.
The "Institutional Imperative" perspective, suggesting an increase in the institution of
amakudari, receives only a partial support. An overall increase in amakudari placem~nts from
1963 to 1992 suggests amakudari is an institutionalized form ,of government-business
cooperation, which will, in tum, contribute to increasing amakudari placements. Again, the
concept of increase raises questions. The pattern of increase and decrease varies considerably
among ministries. Although some decline of amakudari occurs after 1985 overall and in specific
ministries, the 30 year trend does not indicate a pattern of decrease.
The "government-control" perspective suggests that the shifts in amakudari indicate the
changing influence of government ministries over the economy.

In particular, the relative

change in amakudari placements suggest the decline of MITI' s influence and the rise by MoF.
The relative decline of MITI is supported by the data. MITI was no longer the top ministry by
the mid-1960s, though it retained the second or the third position consistently, along with the
Ministries of Construction and Transportation.

In contrast to MITI, MoF outpaced other ministries in the placement of retiring
bureaucrats in private industry. Since 1981 to the present, MoF had 50 or more amakudari per
year, which is almost twice the number as that of the number two ministry, MoC, during the
same period.
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Other ministries, such as the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine Products
and Posts and Telecommunications, and Tax Agency competed with MITI and MoT and MoC
from time to time. In general, amakudari increased in the second half of 1970s and first half
of 1980s, with a s·teady decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In other words, all the
ministries, except MoF, moved in a similar manner, rising or falling, over the three decades.
This suggests the strong need to distinguish MoF from other ministries.

CONCLUSION

Amakudan appears to be an historically sensitive process linked to a complex causal
process. Our characterization of three perspectives on amakudari was not ineant to create some
fixed boxes into which we force different authors into different perspectives. The work of
Johnson (1974; 1975; 1982) illustrates how one author, appreciative of the complexity of the
process, may be placed into all three perspectives. Rather, our concern was to use the three
perspectives to· draw out -the implications of some simple but prevalent points of view.
Our analysis suggests that·amakudari is one type of relationship in the multiplex network
society· of Japan that has important. spatial and temporal distinctions that should be incorporated
into future analyses.

The amakudari process is one of the key ties binding together the

government and business sectors. The amakudari process does not appear to operate in the same
manner across the different ministries.

This feature is dramatically demonstrated by the

exceptional pattern of the Ministry of Finance, noted· earlier. In addition., the number of

amakudari placeroents do not operate in a simple linear manner over time. The different periods
discussed in the paper suggest different, non-transitive features operating. Thus, the selection
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of any one segment of time may distort the interpretation of the nature and future of amakudari.
In addition, our analysis suggests two general directions for future research on

amakudari. First, separate analysis is needed to examine bureaucratic retirement to public
corporations. Such a study will complement the work on amakudari. Some authors suggest the
direction of amakudari has shifted from private firms to public organizations. Empirical studies
on career movement of civil servants to public corporations with a methodology similar to the
one we employed in this paper will answer questions about the changing nature of amakudari
more clearly.
A second strategy of analysis is to map the overall structure of the "network" of

amakudari placements. This would involve the identification of the overall pattern of amakudari
placements and the relations of each ministry to each other and the private sector firms and even
specific positions. Next, important specification would be gained from the examination of causes
and consequences of variation in amakudari placements (e.g., Calder, 1989). This step should
include the identification of historical "phases" of amakudari placements (e.g., changes in the
sectors, industries and firms that receive amakudari from certain ministries over time).
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Appendix A

List of Ministries and Agencies cin English)
The Cabinet
National Personnel Agency
Prime Minister's Office
National Police Agency
Imperial Household Agency
Management and Coordination Agency
Hokkaido Development Agency
Defense Agency
Defense Facilities Administration Agency
Economic Planning Agency
· pcience and Technology Agency
Environmental Agency
Okinawa Development Agency
National land Agency
Ministry of Justice
Public Security Investigation Agency
Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Finance
National Tax Administration Agency
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
_ Agency for Cultural Affairs
Ministry of Health and Welfare
Social Insurance Agency
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Food Agency
Forestry Agency
Fisheries Agency
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Agency of Industriai Science and Technology
Agency of National Resources and Energy
Patent Office
Small and Medium Enterprises Agency
Ministry of Transport
Maritime Safety Agency
High Marine Accidents Inquiry Agency
Meteorological Agency
Ministry of Posts and telecommunications
Ministry of Labor
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Home Affairs
Fire-Defense Agency
Board of Audit
Supreme Court of Justice
Source: Who's Who in Japanese Government.
Cultural Association, 1988: 287~288).

--------- -- ------

--

----

(Tokyo:

International
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Appendix B
Total Amakudari Placements by Year

Year

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
mean

Number of Placements

165
133

128
147
123
137

177
193
167
177
181
189
176
159
198
197
233
228
249

268
267
295
320
252
262
233
248
232
218
209
205
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Table 1.
I

.Ranking Order of Ministries by Number of Amakudari, 1963-1992

Rank 1963

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1992

1

MoT

MoF

MoF.

MoF

MoF

MoF

MoF

MoF

2

MoF

MITI

MITI

MoC

MoC

MITI

MITI

MoC

3

MITI

MoT

MoT

MoT

MITI

MAFM

MoC

MAFM

4

MoC

MoC

MAFM

MAFM

MoT

MoT

MAFM

MITI

5

TA

MAFM

MPT

MITI
TA

TA

MPT

MPT

MoT

Note: MoT = Ministry of Transportation; MoF = Ministry of Finance; MITI = Ministry of
International Trade and Industry; MoC = Ministry of Construction; MAFM = Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine Products; MPT = Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication
Services; TA = Tax Agency.
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Ministry of Construction
Amakudari Placements (1963-1992)
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Ministry of Transportation
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FIGURE 2.5.
Min. Agri., Forestry & Marine Products
Amakudari Placements (1963-1992)
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